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Security for 5G Mobile Wireless Networks
Dongfeng Fang, Yi Qian, and Rose Qingyang Hu
Abstract—The advanced features of 5G mobile wireless net-
work systems yield new security requirements and challenges.
This paper presents a comprehensive survey on security of 5G
wireless network systems compared to the traditional cellular
networks. The paper starts with a review on 5G wireless networks
particularities as well as on the new requirements and motiva-
tions of 5G wireless security. The potential attacks and security
services with the consideration of new service requirements and
new use cases in 5G wireless networks are then summarized. The
recent development and the existing schemes for the 5G wireless
security are presented based on the corresponding security ser-
vices including authentication, availability, data confidentiality,
key management and privacy. The paper further discusses the
new security features involving different technologies applied
to 5G such as heterogeneous networks, device-to-device com-
munications, massive multiple-input multiple-output, software
defined networks and Internet of Things. Motivated by these
security research and development activities, we propose a new
5G wireless security architecture, based on which the analysis
of identity management and flexible authentication is provided.
As a case study, we explore a handover procedure as well as
a signaling load scheme to show the advantage of the proposed
security architecture. The challenges and future directions of 5G
wireless security are finally summarized.
Index Terms—5G wireless network systems, security, authen-
tication, availability, confidentiality, key management, privacy,
heterogenous networks, device-to-device communications, mas-
sive multiple-input multiple-output, software defined networks,
Internet of Things, 5G wireless security architecture.
I. INTRODUCTION
5TH generation wireless systems, or 5G, are the next gen-eration mobile wireless telecommunications beyond the
current 4G/International Mobile Telecommunications (IMT)-
Advanced Systems [1]. 5G wireless system is not only an
evolution of the legacy 4G cellular networks, but also a system
with many new service capabilities [2]. 5G research and devel-
opment aim at various advanced characteristics, such as higher
capacity than current 4G, higher density of mobile broadband
users, and supporting device-to-device (D2D) communications
and massive machine-type communications [3]. 5G planning
also aims at lower latency and lower energy consumption,
for better implementation of Internet of Things (IoT) [4].
More specifically, there are eight advanced features of 5G
wireless systems, 1-10 Gbps connections to end points in the
field, 1 millisecond latency, 1000x bandwidth per unit area,
10-100x number of connected devices, 99.999% availability,
100% coverage, 90% reduction of network energy usage and
This work was supported by the National Science Foundation under the
grants ECCS-1307580, ECCS-1308006, EARS-1547312, and EARS-1547330.
D. Fang, and Y. Qian are with the Department of Electrical and Computer
Engineering, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Omaha, NE 68182. E-mail:
dongfeng.fang@huskers.unl.edu; yqian2@unl.edu.
R. Q. Hu is with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering,
Utah State University, Logan, UT 84321. E-mail: rose.hu@usu.edu.
up to ten years battery life for low power devices [5]. To
achieve these performance requirements, various technologies
[6] are applied to 5G systems, such as heterogenous net-
works (HetNet), massive multiple-input multiple-output (MI-
MO), millimeter wave (mmWave) [7], D2D communications
[8], software defined network (SDN) [9], network functions
visualization (NFV) [10] and networking slicing [11]. The
standardization process for 5G wireless systems is just at
the very beginning. Fig. 1 illustrates a generic architecture
of 5G wireless systems. 5G wireless systems can provide not
only traditional voice and data communications, but also many
new use cases, new industry applications, and a multitude
of devices and applications to connect society at large [12].
Different 5G use cases are specified such as vehicle-to-vehicle
and vehicle-to-infrastructure communications, industrial au-
tomation, health services, smart cities, smart homes and so
on [13]. It is believed that 5G wireless systems can enhance
mobile broadband with critical services and massive IoT [14].
The new architecture, new technologies, and new use cases in
5G wireless systems will bring new challenges to security and
privacy protection [15].
Due to the broadcast nature and the limited bandwidth of
wireless communications, it is possible but difficult to provide
security features such as authentication, integrity and confi-
dentiality. There are various security issues in current cellular
networks at media access control layer (MAC) and physical
layer (PHY) in terms of possible attacks, vulnerabilities and
privacy concerns [16]. The security protections of voice and
data are provided based on traditional security architectures
with security features as user identity management, mutual
authentications between the network and user equipment (UE),
securing communication channel and so on. In the legacy
cellular networks - Long Term Evolution (LTE), a high level
of security and trustworthiness for users and network operators
are provided [12]. Besides encryption of user traffic, mutual
authentication is achieved between a UE and a base station. In
addition, the security of the access and the mobility manage-
ment of LTE are ensured by a key hierarchy and handover key
management mechanism [17]. There are also research work on
security related to the technologies applied to LTE [18] [19].
However, new security requirements are needed to support a
variety of new use cases and the new networking paradigms
[20]. The security mechanisms are needed to comply with the
overall 5G advanced features such as low latency and high
energy efficiency (EE) [20]. The Next Generation Mobile Net-
works (NGMN) Alliance highlights the security requirements
of 5G wireless networks shown in Table. I. Moreover, unlike
the legacy cellular networks, 5G wireless networks are going
to be service-oriented which has a special emphasis on security
and privacy requirements from the perspective of services [15].
Fig. 2 illustrates the main drives for 5G wireless security.
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Fig. 1: A generic architecture for 5G wireless systems
TABLE I: Security requirements for 5G wireless networks [21]
Requirements respect to 4G
Improve resilience and availability of the network against signaling based threats
including overload caused maliciously or unexpectedly
Specific security design for use cases which require extremely low latency
Comply with security requirements defined in 4G 3GPP standards.
Need to apply especially to a virtualized implementation of the network
Provide Public Safety and Mission Critical Communications (resilience and high
availability)
Requirements
from radio access perspective
Improve system robustness against smart jamming attacks
Improve security for 5G small cell nodes
Supreme Built-in-Security
Flexible Security Mechanisms
Automation
New use cases
New technologies
New networking paradigms
New threats
New trust models
Changing ecosystem
Growing need for dependability
Fig. 2: Major drives for 5G wireless security
The new use cases can have a variety of specific requirements
such as ultra-low latency in the user communications. New
technologies not only yield advanced service capabilities but
also open door to vulnerabilities and thus impose new security
requirements in 5G [22][23]. In HetNet, different access tech-
nologies may have different security requirements, and multi-
network environment may need high frequent authentications
with stringent delay constraints [24]. Massive MIMO has
been deemed an important 5G technique to achieve higher
User Network
Server
User 
Service
Network
Services
Trust Trust
4G Network 5G Network
Fig. 3: Trust model of 4G and 5G wireless networks
spectral efficient and energy efficiency. It is also considered
as a valuable technique against passive eavesdropping [25].
Furthermore, SDN and NFV in 5G will support new service
delivery models and thus require new security aspects [26]
[27]. With the advent of 5G networking paradigms, new
security architecture is needed [28]. To address these issues,
security must be considered as an integral part of the overall
architecture and should be integrated into the system design at
the very beginning. To support various use cases and new trust
models in an optimal way, flexible security mechanisms are
needed. The trust models of the legacy cellular networks and
5G wireless networks are presented in Fig. 3 [15]. Authenti-
cations are required not only between subscribers and the two
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operators (the home and serving networks) but also among ser-
vice parties in 5G wireless networks. Moreover, for the vertical
industries use case, the security demands can be significantly
different among different applications. For instance, mobile
devices require lightweight security mechanisms as its power
resource constraint, while high-speed services require efficient
security services with low latency. Therefore, the general flex-
ibility for 5G security mechanisms is another key requirement
[29]. The authentication management in 5G is more complex
due to various types of and a massive number of devices
connected. For different applications, different authentication
models can be implemented. In Fig. 3, user authentication can
be done by the network provider, or by the service provider, or
by both. Besides the flexibility requirement of 5G security, se-
curity automation is also a key element. It combines automated
holistic security management with automated and intelligent
security controls [20]. Since more personal information is
used in various applications such as surveillance applied over
5G wireless networks, privacy concerns escalate. Moreover,
various services in 5G can be tied closer than before. As an
example, the fixed telephone line, internet access, and TV
service can be terminated simultaneously due to the outage
of a major network [15]. Therefore, security automation is
needed to make the 5G system robust against various security
attacks.
Security attacks can be classified into two types, namely,
passive attacks and active attacks [30]. For a passive attack,
attackers attempt to learn or make use of the information
from the legitimate users but do not intend to attack the
communication itself. The popular passive attacks in a cel-
lular network are two kinds, i.e., eavesdropping and traffic
analysis. Passive attacks aim to violate data confidentiality
and user privacy. Unlike passive attacks, active attacks can
involve modification of the data or interruption of legitimate
communications. Typical active attacks include man-in-the-
middle attack (MITM), replay attack, denial of service (DoS)
attack, and distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack.
The mechanisms used to tackle security attacks can be
mainly divided into two categories: cryptographic approaches
with new networking protocols and physical layer security
(PLS) approaches. The cryptographic techniques are the most
commonly used security mechanisms, which are normally
deployed at the upper layers of the 5G wireless networks with
new networking protocols. The modern cryptography consists
of symmetric-key cryptography and public-key cryptography.
Symmetric-key cryptography refers to the encryption methods
in which a secret key is shared between a sender and a receiver.
Public-key cryptography or asymmetric cryptography uses two
different keys, one is used as the public key for encryption
and the other one is used as the secret key for decryption.
The performance of a security service depends on the key
length and computational complexity of the algorithms. The
management and distribution of the symmetric keys are well
protected in the traditional cellular networks. Due to more
complex protocols and heterogeneous network architectures in
5G, the management and distribution of symmetric keys may
encounter new challenges [31].
Due to the limited progress on practical wiretap codes and
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Fig. 4: Elements in a 5G security architecture [20]
on strictly positive secrecy capacity in the 1970s and 1980s,
the application of PLS has been hampered. At that time,
most contemporary security schemes adopted the public-key
cryptography [32]. The interest on using PLS quickly mounted
after [33] proved that it is still possible for a legitimate user
with a worse channel than the eavesdropper to generate a secret
key over an insecure public channel. There have been extensive
PLS research done recently in 5G wireless systems. Unlike
conventional approaches that provide security mainly through
cryptographic techniques, PLS is identified as a promising
security strategy to provide secure wireless transmissions by
exploiting the unique wireless physical layer medium features
[34]. Compared to cryptography, PLS demonstrates advantages
in two aspects, namely, low computational complexity and
high scalability, which make PLS an ideal candidate technique
for cryptographic key distribution in 5G wireless networks.
In [31], authors summarized the existing PLS techniques
and grouped them into five major categories based on their
theoretical security capacity, power, code, channel, and signal
approaches.
Besides PLS and cryptographic techniques, there have been
some research work on security architecture [35], vulnerability
assessment mechanisms [36], and intrusion detection mecha-
nisms based on data analysis [37]. These security mechanisms
need to comply with the 5G performance requirements such as
extremely low latency and high degree of EE. The 5G security
requirements thus need to consider the legacy security features,
new use cases, and new networking paradigms altogether. Fig.
4 presents the typical elements in a 5G security architecture.
Edge cloud is applied to improve the network performance
by reducing the communication delay. Central cloud is used
to connect the edge clouds for data sharing and centralized
control.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as
follows. We first discuss various attacks as well as the state-of-
the-art solutions in 5G wireless networks based on security ser-
vices. The new security concerns on the technologies applied
to 5G wireless network systems are then presented. Motivated
by these security research and development activities, we
further propose a new 5G wireless security architecture, based
on which the analysis of identity management and flexible
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authentication is provided. As a case study, we examine a
handover procedure as well as a signaling load scheme to
show the advantage of the proposed security architecture.
The challenges and future directions of 5G wireless network
security are finally summarized.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The attacks
and security services in 5G wireless networks are introduced
in section II. In section III, recent development and current
solutions in 5G wireless security are discussed. In section
IV, security issues for different technologies applied to 5G
are elaborated. In section V, we propose a 5G wireless
security architecture. The analysis of identity management and
flexible authentication based on the new security architecture is
presented. A handover procedure and signaling load analysis
are studied to show the advantage of the proposed security
architecture. In section VI, challenges and future directions for
5G wireless security are introduced. In section VII, conclusion
is presented.
II. ATTACKS AND SECURITY SERVICES IN 5G WIRELESS
NETWORKS
Due to the broadcast nature of the wireless medium, wire-
less information transmission is vulnerable to various mali-
cious threats. In this section, we discuss four types of attacks,
i.e., eavesdropping and traffic analysis, jamming, DoS and
DDoS, and MITM, in 5G wireless networks. We also introduce
four security services including authentication, confidentiality,
availability, and integrity.
A. Attacks in 5G Wireless Networks
Fig. 5 illustrates all four attacks, each of which is individu-
ally discussed in the following three aspects, type of the attack
(passive or active), security services provided to fight against
this attack, and the corresponding methods applied to avoid or
prevent this attack. We focus on security attacks at the PHY
layer and MAC layer, where the key difference on security
between wireless and wire-line networks occur.
1) Eavesdropping and Traffic Analysis: Eavesdropping is
an attack that is used by an unintended receiver to intercept
a message from others. Eavesdropping is a passive attack as
the normal communication is not affected by eavesdropping,
as shown in Fig. 5a. Due to the passive nature, eavesdropping
is hard to detect. Encryption of the signals over the radio link
is most commonly applied to fight against the eavesdropping
attack. The eavesdropper can not intercept the received signal
directly due to the encryption. Traffic analysis is another
passive attack that an unintended receiver uses to intercept in-
formation such as location and identity of the communication
parties by analyzing the traffic of the received signal without
understanding the content of the signal itself. In other word,
even the signal is encrypted, traffic analysis can still be used
to reveal the patterns of the communication parties. Traffic
analysis attack does not impact the legitimate communications
either.
Encryption method used to prevent eavesdropping is heavily
dependent on the strength of the encryption algorithm and
also on the computing capability of the eavesdropper. Due
to the quick escalation of computing power and booming of
advanced data analysis technologies, eavesdropper can take
the advantage of the new technologies in theirs attacks. The
existing mechanisms to tackle eavesdropping face a big chal-
lenge as many of them assume a small number of simultaneous
eavesdroppers with low computing capability and low data
analysis capability. Moreover, some technologies applied to
5G wireless networks such as HetNet may further increase
the difficulty to fight against eavesdroppers. In general the
new characteristics of 5G wireless networks lead to many
more complicated scenarios to cope with eavesdroppers, for
example, in [38], eavesdroppers with multiple antennas are
considered. As cryptographic methods to tackle eavesdropping
have been extensively investigated in the past and are con-
sidered rather mature, most recently, PLS research to tackle
eavesdropping has been paid more and more attentions.
2) Jamming: Unlike eavesdropping and traffic analysis,
jamming can completely disrupt the communications between
legitimate users. Fig. 5b is an example for jamming attack.
The malicious node can generate intentional interference that
can disrupt the data communications between legitimate users.
Jamming can also prevent authorized users from accessing
radio resources. The solutions for active attacks are normally
detection based.
Spread spectrum techniques such as direct sequence spread
spectrum (DSSS) and frequency hopping spread spectrum
(FHSS) are widely used as a secure communication method
to fight against jamming at the PHY layer by spreading the
signals over a wider spectral bandwidth. However, DSSS and
FHSS based anti-jamming schemes may not fit into some
applications in 5G wireless networks. In [39], a pseudorandom
time hopping anti-jamming scheme is proposed for cognitive
users to improve the performance compared to FHSS. Due to
the characteristics of jamming, detection is possible. In [40],
a resource allocation strategy is proposed between a fusion
center and a jammer. Resource allocation is applied to improve
the detection to achieve a better error rate performance.
3) DoS and DDoS: DoS attacks can exhaust the network
resources by an adversary. DoS is a security attack violation
of the availability of the networks. Jamming can be used
to launch a DoS attack. DDoS can be formed when more
than one distributed adversary exists. Fig.5c shows a DDoS
model. DoS and DDoS are both active attacks that can be
applied at different layers. Currently, detection is mostly used
to recognize DoS and DDoS attacks. With a high penetration
of massive devices in 5G wireless networks, DoS and DDoS
will likely become a serious threat for operators [21]. DoS
and DDoS attacks in 5G wireless networks can attack the
access network via a very large number of connected devices.
Based on the attacking target, a DoS attack can be identified
either as a network infrastructure DoS attack or a device/user
DoS attack [21]. A DoS attack against the network infrastruc-
ture can strike the signaling plane, user plane, management
plane, support systems, radio resources, logical and physical
resources [21]. A DoS attack against device/user can target on
battery, memory, disk, CPU, radio, actuator and sensors [21].
4) MITM: In MITM attack, the attacker secretly takes con-
trol of the communication channel between two legitimate par-
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Fig. 5: Attacks in 5G wireless networks (a). Eavesdropping; (b). Jamming; (c). DDoS; (d). MITM
ties. The MITM attacker can intercept, modify, and replace the
communication messages between the two legitimate parties.
Fig. 5d shows a MITM attack model. MITM is an active attack
that can be launched in different layers. In particular, MITM
attacks aim to compromise data confidentiality, integrity, and
availability. Based on the Verizon’s data investigation report
[41], MITM attack is one of the most common security attacks.
In the legacy cellular network, false base station based MITM
is an attack that the attacker forces a legitimate user to create
a connection with a fake base transceiver station [42]. Mutual
authentication between the mobile device and the base station
is normally used to prevent the false base station based MITM.
B. Security Services in 5G Wireless Networks
The new architecture, new technologies, and use cases in 5G
wireless networks bring in new features and requirements of
security services. In this section, we primarily introduce four
types of security services: authentication (entity authentication,
message authentication), confidentiality (data confidentiality,
privacy), availability, and integrity.
1) Authentication: There are two kinds of authentications,
namely, entity authentication and message authentication. Both
entity authentication and message authentication are important
in 5G wireless networks to tackle the previous mentioned
attacks. Entity authentication is used to ensure the communi-
cating entity is the one that it claims to be. In the legacy cel-
lular networks, mutual authentication between user equipment
(UE) and mobility management entity (MME) is implemented
before the two parties communicating to each other. The
mutual authentications between UE and MME is the most
important security feature in the traditional cellular security
framework. The authentication and key agreement (AKA) in
4G LTE cellular networks is symmetric-key based. However,
5G requires authentication not only between UE and MME
but also between other third parties such as service providers.
Since the trust model differs from that used in the traditional
cellular networks, hybrid and flexible authentication manage-
ment is needed in 5G. The hybrid and flexible authentication of
UE can be implemented in three different ways: authentication
by network only, authentication by service provider only, and
authentication by both network and service provider [15].
Due to the very high speed data rate and extremely low
latency requirement in 5G wireless networks, authentication
in 5G is expected to be much faster than ever. Moreover, the
multi-tier architecture of the 5G may encounter very frequent
handovers and authentications between different tiers in 5G.
In [43], to overcome the difficulties of key management in
HetNets and to reduce the unnecessary latency caused by
frequent handovers and authentications between different tiers,
a SDN enabled fast authentication scheme using weighted
secure-context-information transfer is proposed to improve the
efficiency of authentication during handovers and to meet 5G
latency requirement. To provide more security services in 5G
wireless networks, in [44][45], a public-key based AKA is
proposed.
With the various new applications in 5G wireless net-
works, message authentication becomes increasingly impor-
tant. Moreover, with the more strict requirements on latency,
spectrum efficiency (SE), and EE in 5G, message authenti-
cation is facing new challenges. In [46] an efficient Cyclic
Redundancy Check (CRC) based message authentication for
5G is proposed to enable the detection of both random and
malicious error without increasing bandwidth.
2) Confidentiality: Confidentiality consists of two aspects,
i.e., data confidentiality and privacy. Data confidentiality pro-
tects data transmission from passive attacks by limiting the
data access to intended users only and preventing the access
from or disclosure to unauthorized users. Privacy prevents
controlling and influencing the information related to legiti-
mate users, for example, privacy protects traffic flows from
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any analysis of an attacker. The traffic patterns can be used
to diagnose sensitive information, such as senders/receivers
location, etc. With various applications in 5G, there exist
massive data related to user privacy, e.g., vehicle routing data,
health monitoring data, and so on.
Data encryption has been widely used to secure the data
confidentiality by preventing unauthorized users from extract-
ing any useful information from the broadcast information.
Symmetric key encryption technique can be applied to encrypt
and decrypt data with one private key shared between the
sender and the receiver. To share a key between the sender
and the receiver, a secure key distribution method is required.
Conventional cryptography method is designed based on the
assumption that attackers have limited computing capabilities.
Thus it is hard to fight against attackers who are equipped with
powerful computing capabilities. Rather than relying solely
upon generic higher-layer cryptographic mechanisms, PLS
can support confidentiality service [47] against jamming and
eavesdropping attacks. Besides the data services of 5G, users
start to realize the importance of privacy protection service.
Privacy service in 5G deserves much more attention than in the
legacy cellular networks due to the massive data connections
[12]. Anonymity service is a basic security requirement in
many user cases. In many cases, privacy leakage can cause
serious consequences. For examples, health monitoring data
reveals the sensitive personal health information [45]; vehicle
routing data can expose the location privacy [44]. 5G wireless
networks raise serious concerns on privacy leakage. In Het-
Nets, due to the high density of small cells, the association
algorithm can reveal the location privacy of users. In [48],
a differential private algorithm is proposed to protect the
location privacy. In [49], the privacy in group communications
is secured by the proposed protocol. In [44], cryptographic
mechanisms and schemes are proposed to provide secure and
privacy-aware real-time video reporting service in vehicular
networks.
3) Availability: Availability is defined as the degree to
which a service is accessible and usable to any legitimate users
whenever and wherever it is requested. Availability evaluates
how robust the system is when facing various attacks and it is
a key performance metric in 5G. Availability attack is a typical
active attack. One of the major attacks on availability is DoS
attack, which can cause service access denial to legitimate
users. Jamming or interference can disrupt the communication
links between legitimate users by interfering the radio signals.
With massive unsecured IoT nodes, 5G wireless networks face
a big challenge on preventing jamming and DDoS attacks to
ensure the availability service.
For the availability at PHY, DSSS and FHSS are two
classical PLS solutions. DSSS was first applied to the military
in 1940s. A pseudo noise spreading code is multiplied with the
spectrum of the original data signal in DSSS. Without knowl-
edge on the pseudo noise spreading code, a jammer needs
a much higher power to disrupt the legitimate transmission.
For FHSS, a signal is transmitted by rapidly switching among
many frequency channels using a pseudorandom sequence
generated by a key shared between transmitter and receiver.
Dynamic spectrum is applied to D2D communications and
cognitive radio paradigm to improve the SE in 5G. In [39], the
authors pointed out that FHSS can cause bad performance with
the jamming attack. A pseudorandom time hopping spread
spectrum is proposed to improve the performance on jam-
ming probability, switching probability, and error probability.
Resource allocation is adopted to improve the detection of the
availability violation [40].
4) Integrity: Although message authentication provides the
corroboration of the source of the message, there is no pro-
tection provided against the duplication or modification of the
message. 5G aims to provide connectivity anytime, anywhere,
and anyhow, and to support applications closely related to
human being daily life such as metering for the quality of
the drinking water and scheduling of the transportation. The
integrity of data is one of the key security requirements in
certain applications.
Integrity prevents information from being modified or al-
tered by active attacks from unauthorized entities. Data integri-
ty can be violated by insider malicious attacks such as message
injection or data modification. Since the insider attackers have
valid identities, it is difficult to detect these attacks. In use
cases such as smart meters in smart grid [50], data integrity
service needs to be provided against manipulation. Compared
to voice communications, data can be more easily attacked
and modified [51]. Integrity services can be provided by using
mutual authentication, which can generate an integrity key.
The integrity service of personal health information is required
[45]. Message integrity can be provided in the authentication
schemes [44].
III. STATE-OF-THE-ART IN 5G WIRELESS SECURITY
In this section, we summarize the state-of-the-arts including
recent development and current solutions for security in 5G
wireless network systems. As indicated in the previous section,
cryptography and PLS are two major security solutions.
Many new PHY technologies in 5G wireless networks
launched considerable research work in PLS. Most PLS
research work are based on resource allocation. In [52] a
security-oriented resource allocation scheme is considered in
ultra-dense networks (UDNs). The authors presented several
resource dimensions with the influence of security transmis-
sion. The main resource dimensions mentioned are power al-
location, relay selection, frequency allocation, time allocation,
and beamforming. The open issues and future directions in
PLS are discussed, including interference management, substi-
tute for dedicated jammer, security over mobility management,
and handing the heterogeneity. A case study for cross layer
cooperation scheme in HetNet is presented when considering
multiple users and SBSs in UDNs. For better understanding the
PLS, two metrics used to evaluate the security performance are
introduced as secrecy capacity and secrecy outage probability.
The secrecy capacity Cs is defined as:
Cs = Cm   Ce; (1)
where the Cm is the main channel capacity of the legitimate
user, and the Ce is the channel capacity of the eavesdropper.
The secrecy outage probability is defined as the instantaneous
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secrecy capacity is less than a target secrecy rate Rt, where
Rt > 0, and:
Pout(Rs) = P (Cs < Rt); (2)
Besides these two metrics, with the consumed power, in [53],
secrecy EE is defined as the ratio between the system achiev-
able secrecy rate and the corresponding consumed power.
The new development and solutions in cryptography have
mainly targeted at new applications. There have been develop-
ment and proposed solutions on the security services including
authentication, availability, confidentiality, and key manage-
ment. Due to the escalated privacy concerns in 5G wireless
networks, we further separate the confidentiality solutions into
data confidentiality based and privacy based.
A. Authentication
Authentication is one of the most important security services
in 5G wireless networks. In the legacy cellular networks,
an authentication scheme is normally symmetric-key based.
The implementation of the authentication scheme can deliver
several security requirements. In the third generation (3G)
cellular networks, the mutual authentication is implemented
between a mobile station and the network. Following the
authentication, a cipher key and an integrity key are generated
to ensure both data confidentiality and integrity between the
mobile station and the base station.
Due to the low latency requirement of 5G networks, au-
thentication schemes are required to be more efficient in 5G
than ever before. To leverage the advantages of SDN, in [43],
a fast authentication scheme in SDN is proposed, which uses
weighed secure-context-information (SCI) transfer as a non-
cryptographic security technique to improve authentication
efficiency during high frequent handovers in a HetNet in
order to address the the latency requirement. Compared with
the digital cryptographic authentication methods, the proposed
method is hard to be totally compromised since it is based on
the user-inherent physical layer attributes. There are more than
one physical layer characteristics used in SCI to improve the
authentication reliability for applications requiring a high level
of security. The SDN enabled authentication model is shown in
Fig. 6. The SDN controller implements an authentication mod-
el to monitor and predict the user location in order to prepare
the relevant cells before the user arrival. This helps achieve
seamless handover authentication. Physical layer attributes are
used to provide unique fingerprints of the user and to simplify
authentication procedure. Three kinds of fingerprints are used
as the user-specific physical layer attributes. The validated
original attributes are obtained after a full authentication.
The observations are collected through constantly sampling
multiple physical layer attributes from the received packets
at the SDN controller. Both the original file and observation
results contain the mean value of the attributes and variance of
the chosen attributes. Then the mean attribute offset can be cal-
culated based on the validated original attributes and observed
attributes. If the attribute offset is less than a pre-determined
threshold, the user equipment is considered legitimate. The
detection probability is presented in the paper. To evaluate
the performance of the proposed method, a SDN network
SDN Controller
AP
Small cell
AP
Small cell
BS
Pico-cell
BS
Pico-cell
1. Full authentication
2. Secure context transfer
3. Fast authentication
Fig. 6: A SDN enabled authentication model [43]
model using priority queuing is proposed. The arriving traffic
is modeled as a Pareto distribution. Authentication delay is
compared among different network utilization scenarios. The
proposed fast authentication protocol includes full authenti-
cation and weighted SCI transfer based fast authentication.
As shown in Fig. 6, after the first full authentication in one
cell, it can be readily applied in other cells with MAC address
verification, which only needs local processing. Moreover, full
authentication can even be done without disrupting the user
communication. A valid time duration parameter is used to
flexibly adjust the secure level requirement. The simulation
results compared the delay performance between the SDN
enabled fast authentication and the conventional cryptographic
authentication method. The SDN enabled fast authentication
has a better delay performance owing to SDN flexibility and
programmability in 5G networks.
To address the issues caused by the lack of a security
infrastructure for D2D communications, in [54], a security-
scoring based on continuous authenticity is developed to
evaluate and improve the security of D2D wireless systems.
The principle of legitimacy patterns is proposed to implement
continuous authenticity, which enables attack detection and
system security scoring measurement. For the legitimacy pat-
tern, a redundant sequence of bits is inserted into a packet
to enable the attack detection. The simulation results show
the feasibility of implementing the proposed security scoring
using legitimacy patterns. The authors pointed out that legit-
imacy patterns considering technical perspectives and human
behaviors could improve the performance.
Combining the high security and utmost efficiency in band-
width utilization and energy consumption in 5G, in [46], the
authors proposed a new cyclic redundancy check (CRC)-based
message authentication which can detect any double-bit errors
in a single message. The CRC codes based cryptographic
hash functions are defined. A linear feedback shift register
(LFSR) is used to efficiently implement the CRC encoding
and decoding. The message authentication algorithm outputs
an authentication tag based on a secret key and the message.
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Fig. 7: The authentication process of the RFID secure appli-
cation revocation scheme [55]
It is assumed that the adversary has the family of hash
functions but not the particular polynomial g(x) and the
pad s that are used to generate the authentication tag. The
generator polynomial is changed periodically at the beginning
of each session and pad s is changed for every message. The
new family of cryptographic hash functions based on CRC
codes with generator polynomials in g(x) = (1 + x)p(x)
are introduced, where p(x) is a primitive polynomial. The
proposed CRC retains most of the implementation simplicity
of cryptographically non-secure CRCs. However, the applied
LFSR requires re-programmable connections.
Radio frequency identification (RFID) has been widely
applied and a single RFID tag can integrate multiple appli-
cations. Due to various limitations in low-cost RFID tags, the
encryption algorithms and authentication mechanisms applied
to RFID systems need to be very efficient. Thus simple
and fast hash function are considered for the authentication
mechanisms. Moreover, with multiple applications of single
RFID, the revocation should be taken consideration into the
authentication scheme. In [55], the authors proposed a revo-
cation method in the RFID secure authentication scheme in
5G use cases. A hash function and a random number are
used to generate the corresponding module through a typical
challenge-response mechanism. Fig. 7 shows the authentica-
tion process of the RFID secure application revocation scheme.
The reader contains a pseudo-random number generator (PNG)
and the sever holds a hash function and a database (HFD).
The server establishes a tag record for each legitimate tag as
(IDS, IDi) and a group of corresponding application records
as (Koldi,j ,Knowi,j ). q is the authentication request generated by
the reader. r1 is the first random number generated by the
PNG in reader. After receiving the authentication request, the
tag generates the second random number r2 and calculates
two hash authentication messages M1, M2, and value of XOR
authentication information F = E
L
Ki,j , where E is the
current value of the status flag information, which is used to
determine whether to revoke or to certify the application. The
security and complexity results are presented, which show that
Key 
generator 
center
R
S
R
R R
R
 ...
Network 
manager
Medical service 
provider 
(Physician)
Wireless body area 
network client
Fig. 8: A m-health system model [45]
the proposed scheme has a higher level of security and the
same level of complexity compared with existing ones.
Considering the open nature of D2D communications be-
tween medical sensors and the high privacy requirements of
the medical data, in [45], by utilizing certificate-less gener-
alized signcryption (CLGSC) technique, the authors proposed
a light-weight and robust security-aware (LRSA) D2D-assist
data transmission protocol in a m-health system. The m-health
system is modeled in Fig. 8, where S indicates the source
node, and R represents the relay node. The anonymous and
mutual authentication is implemented between the client and
the physician in a wireless body area network to protect the
privacy of both the data source and the intended destination.
The signcryption of the message µS and encryption of its
identity eSH are applied to the source client to authenticate the
physician. A certificated-less signature algorithm is applied to
the source client data before it is sent out. The source data
identity can only be recovered by the intended physician who
has the private key (xH , zH). The cipher text µS should be
decrypted after the source identity is recovered with the right
session key. Therefore, even the private key is leaked out,
without the session key, the ciphertext is still safe. On the
other hand, by verifying the signcryption µS , the physician
can authenticate the source client. The relay nodes can verify
the signature and then forward the data with their own sig-
natures. The computational and communication overheads of
the proposed CLGSC are compared with other four schemes.
Simulation results show that the proposed CLGSC scheme has
a lower computational overhead than the other four schemes.
Compared to IEEE 802.11p and the legacy cellular net-
works, 5G is a promising solution to provide real-time services
for vehicular networks. However, the security and privacy need
to be enhanced in order to ensure the safety of transportation.
In [44], a reliable, secure, and privacy-aware 5G vehicular
network supporting real-time video services is presented. The
system architecture is shown in Fig. 9, which includes a mobile
core network (MCN), a trusted authority (TA), a department of
motor vehicles (DMV), and a law enforcement agency (LEA).
D2D communications and mmWave techniques are adopted
in the 5G vehicular communications. As shown in Fig. 9,
HetNet is applied to expand network capacity and achieve
high user data rates. The cloud platform provides massive s-
torage and ubiquitous data access. The proposed cryptographic
mechanisms include a pseudonymous authentication scheme,
a public key encryption with keyword search, a ciphertext-
policy attribute-based encryption, and threshold schemes based
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Fig. 9: A 5G-enabled vehicular network [44]
on secret sharing. The pseudonymous authentication scheme
with strong privacy preservation [56] is applied to optimize the
certification revocation list size, which is in a linear form with
respect to the number of revoked vehicles so that certification
verification overhead is the lowest. The authentication require-
ments include vehicle authentication and message integrity,
where vehicle authentication allows the LEA and official
vehicles to check the sender authenticity. The authentication
is achieved by using a public-key-based digital signature that
binds an encrypted traffic accident video to a pseudonym and
to the real identity of the sender. The pseudonymous authen-
tication technique can achieve the conditional anonymity and
privacy of the sender.
B. Availability
Availability is a key metric to ensure the ultra-reliable
communications in 5G. However, by emitting wireless noise
signals randomly, a jammer can degrade the performance of
the mobile users significantly and can even block the avail-
ability of services. Jamming is one of the typical mechanisms
used by DoS attacks. Most of the anti-jamming schemes use
the frequency-hopping technique, in which users hop over
multiple channels to avoid the jamming attack and to ensure
the availability of services.
In [57], the authors proposed a secret adaptive frequency
hopping scheme as a possible 5G technique against DoS based
on a software defined radio platform. The proposed bit error
rate (BER) estimator based on physical layer information is
applied to decide frequency blacklisting under DoS attack.
Since the frequency hopping technique requires that users have
access to multiple channels, it may not work efficiently for
dynamic spectrum access users due to the high switching rate
and high probability of jamming.
To reduce the switching rate and probability of jamming, in
[39], a pseudorandom time hopping anti-jamming scheme is
Channel Assignment
Slot Assignment Channel
Channel Assignment
Slot Assignment
Transmitter Side Receiver Side
Private Key Pre-shared Key
Fig. 10: A pseudorandom time hopping system block diagram
[39]
proposed for cognitive users in 5G to countermeasure jamming
attacks. The impact of spectrum dynamics on the performance
of mobile cognitive users is modeled with the presence of
a cognitive jammer with limited resources. The analytical
solutions of jamming probability, switching rate, and error
probability are presented. The jamming probability relates to
delay performance and error probability. The jamming proba-
bility is low when the jammer lacks the access opportunities.
Switching probability of time-hopping system outperforms the
frequency-hopping system. With the same average symbol
energy per joule, time-hopping has a lower error probability
than frequency-hopping, and the performance gain saturates
at a certain symbol energy level. The authors pointed out that
the proposed time-hopping technique is a strong candidate for
D2D links in 5G wireless networks due to its good EE and
SE performance as well as its capability in providing jamming
resilience with a small communication overhead. However, a
pre-shared key is required for the time-hopping anti-jamming
technique. The pseudorandom time hopping system block
diagram is shown in Fig. 10. Both frequency hopping and time
hopping require a pre-shared key to determine the hopping
sequence.
Considering the limited computational capabilities at certain
nodes, in [40], a fusion center is used to defend these nodes
from a malicious radio jamming attack over 5G wireless
network. A noncooperative Colonel Blotto game is formulated
between the jammer and the fusion center as an exercise
in strategic resource distribution. Fig. 11 shows the resource
allocation model between fusion center and the malicious
jammer. The jammer aims to jeopardize the network without
getting detected by distributing its power among the nodes
intelligently. On the other hand, the fusion center as a defender
aims to detect such an attack by a decentralized detection
scheme at a certain set of nodes. The fusion center can allocate
more bits to these nodes for reporting the measured inter-
ference. A hierarchal degree is assigned to each node based
on its betweenness centrality. Once the attack is detected,
the fusion center will instruct the target node to increase
its transmit power to maintain a proper SINR for normal
communications. The simulation results show that error rate
performance improves significantly with the fusion center
having more bits to allocate among the nodes. The proposed
resource allocation mechanism outperforms the mechanism
that allocates the available bits in a random manner.
2169-3536 (c) 2017 IEEE. Translations and content mining are permitted for academic research only. Personal use is also permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See
http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/ACCESS.2017.2779146, IEEE
Access
SUBMITTED TO IEEE ACCESS, AUGUST 2017 10
Server
Fusion Center
Server
Jammer
Bandwidth Allocation
Detected feedback
Interference
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Fig. 12: A general system model with eavesdropping attacks
C. Data Confidentiality
Data confidentiality service is commonly required to tack-
le eavesdropping attacks. The general system model with
eavesdropping attacks is shown in Fig.12. The specific sys-
tem models can be different in the number of transmit-
ter/receiver/eavesdropper antennas and in the number of eaves-
droppers/relays/cooperators. The relays or cooperators are
optional in the system. In this subsection, we discuss data
confidentiality based on power control, relay, artificial noise,
signal processing, and cryptographic methods.
1) Power Control: Power control for security aims to con-
trol the transmit power to ensure that the eavesdropper can not
recover the signal. Based on the most simple eavesdropping
attack model with a single eavesdropper armed with a single
antenna, in [58], the authors proposed a distributed algorithm
to secure D2D communications in 5G, which allows two
legitimate senders to select whether to cooperate or not and
to adapt their optimal power allocation based on the selected
cooperation framework. Fig. 12 shows a general system model
with eavesdropping attacks. In the system model in [58],
the sender, relay or cooperator, receiver, and eavesdropper
are named as Alice, John, Bob, and Eve, respectively. Each
user has a single antenna. A shared bi-directional link is
applied between Alice and John. The problem is formulated
to maximize the achievable secrecy rates for both Alice and
John as follows [58]
Ca = max (Rajb  Rae), (3)
s.t.Pj + Pjb  PJ ; (4)
Cj = max (Rjab  Rje), (5)
s.t.Pa + Pab  PA, (6)
where Ca and Cj represent the secrecy rates of Alice and John
respectively. Rajb and Rjab are the achievable rates of Alice
and John respectively with helping to relay data for each other.
Rae and Rje are the achievable rates of eavesdropper from
Alice and from John respectively. Eq. 4 and Eq. 6 represent
the transmit power limitation of the two legitimate senders.
Two cooperation scenarios are considered, namely cooperation
with relay and cooperation without relay. In the cooperation
with relay scenario, Alice and John can help relay data of
each other using the shared bi-directional link. In cooperation
without relay, Alice and John coordinate their respective trans-
mission power to maximize the secrecy rate of the other one.
The optimization problem of noncooperation scenario is also
presented for comparison. The distance between the legitimate
transmitter and the eavesdropper is given a constraint to avoid
distance attacks as the eavesdropper may have a better received
signal quality on the transmitted message than the legitimate
receiver. Simulation results show that achievable secrecy rates
of Alice and John are improved by relaying data for each
other. With the increase of distance between the transmitter
and the receiver, the benefit from cooperation decreases and
at some point non-cooperation could become more beneficial
to the legitimate transmitter.
With no relay or cooperation, based only on power control
and channel access, in [59], the authors developed a Stack-
elberg game framework for analyzing the achieved rate of
cellular users and the secrecy rate of D2D users in 5G by
using PLS. The system model includes one base station (BS), a
number of cellular users, one D2D link, and one eavesdropper,
as shown in Fig. 13. The utility function of cellular user
achieved rates and D2D user secrecy rates are expressed as
functions of channel information and transmission power [59]:
uc,i = log2(1 + SINRc,i) + ↵ PDhdc, (7)
ud = [log2(1+SINRd) log2(1+SINRe)] ↵PDhdc, (8)
where ↵ is the price factor and   is the scale factor. The first
term in uc,i represents the data rate of the ith cellular user, and
the second term compensates the interference from the D2D
link, where PD is the transmit power of the D2D user and hdc
is the channel gain from the D2D user to cellular users. The
utility function of D2D user includes the secrecy data rate and
the payment for the interference to cellular users. The game
strategy of cellular users depends on the price factor ↵ and
game strategy of D2D user depends on the transmission power
PD. The Stackelberg game is formed to maximize cellular
utility function at the first stage and then the utility function
of D2D user at the second stage.
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Fig. 13: The system model with D2D link and an eavesdropper
[59]
Power control is also one of the normally used mechanisms
to improve the EE of the network. In [60], the authors studied
the trade-off between PLS and EE of massive MIMO in an
HetNet. An optimization model is presented to minimize the
total power consumption of the network while satisfying the
security level against eavesdroppers by assuming that the BS
has imperfect channel knowledge on the eavesdroppers. The
simulation results show that a highly dense network topology
can be an effective solution to achieve high capacity, high
cellular EE, and reliable and secure communication channels.
2) Relay: As shown in Fig.12, cooperation with relay can
be used to help the sender to secure the signal transmis-
sion. In [61], two relay selection protocols, namely optimal
relay selection (ORS) and partial relay selection (PRS), are
proposed to secure an energy harvesting relay system in 5G
wireless networks. The system model is shown in Fig. 12,
which consists of multiple relay nodes and assumes there
is no direct link between sender and receiver. The power
beacon is armed with multiple antennas, which can be used
to strengthen the energy harvested. The ORS chooses the
aiding relay to maximize the secrecy capacity of the system
by assuming the source has full knowledge of channel state
information (CSI) on each link. The PRS selects the helping
relay based on partial CSI. The system includes a power
beacon with multiple antennas, several relays, a destination
node and an eavesdropper with a single antenna. Two energy
harvesting scenarios that aim to maximize energy harvesting
for source and selected relay are investigated. The analytical
and asymptotic expressions of secrecy outage probability for
both relay selections protocols are presented. The numerical
results show that ORS can significantly enhance the security
of the proposed system model and can achieve full secrecy
diversity order while PRS can only achieve unit secrecy
diversity order regardless of the energy harvest strategies. PRS
that maximizes energy harvesting for relay strategy has a better
secrecy performance than the one based on the maximizing
energy harvesting for source. Moreover, the results show that
the secrecy performance of the considered system is impacted
significantly by the duration of energy harvest process.
To tackle the complexity issue of relay selection in 5G large-
scale secure two-way relay amplify-and-forward (TWR-AF)
systems with massive relays and eavesdroppers, in [62], the
authors proposed a distributed relay selection criterion that
does not require the information of sources SNR, channel
estimation, or the knowledge of relay eavesdropper links. The
proposed relay selection is done based on the received power
of relays and knowledge of the average channel information
between the source and the eavesdropper. The system model
includes two source nodes, a number of legitimate relay nodes
and multiple passive eavesdroppers. Each node has a single
antenna. The cooperation of eavesdroppers is considered. In
TWR-AF, the received signals from the two sources at the
eavesdropper in each time slot are overlapped, where one
source’s signal acts as the jamming noise. The analytical
results show that the number of eavesdroppers has a severe im-
pact on the secrecy performance. The simulation results show
that the performance of the proposed low-complexity criterion
is very close to that of the optimal selection counterpart.
Considering eavesdroppers and relay with both single and
multiple antennas, in [63], the transmission design for secure
relay communications in 5G networks is studied by assuming
no knowledge on the number or the locations of eavesdroppers.
The locations of eavesdroppers form a homogeneous Poisson
Point Process. A randomize-and-forward relay strategy is
proposed to secure multi-hop communications. Secrecy outage
probability of the two-hop transmission is derived. A secrecy
rate maximization problem is formulated with a secrecy outage
probability constraint. It gives the optimal power allocation
and codeword rate. Simulation results show that the secrecy
outage probability can be improved by equipping each relay
with multiple antennas. The secrecy throughput is enhanced
and secure coverage is extended by appropriately using relay-
ing strategies.
3) Artificial Noise: Artificial noise can be introduced to se-
cure the intended signal transmission. With the artificial-noise-
aided multi-antenna secure transmission under a stochastic ge-
ometry framework, in [24], the authors proposed an association
policy that uses an access threshold for each user to associate
with the BS so that the truncated average received signal power
beyond the threshold is maximized and it can tackle randomly
located eavesdroppers in a heterogeneous cellular network.
The tractable expression of connection probability and se-
crecy probability for a randomly located legitimate user are
investigated. Under the constraints of connection and secrecy
probabilities, the network secrecy throughput and minimum
secrecy throughput of each user are presented. Numerical
results are presented to verify the analytical accuracy.
Assuming the sender is armed with multiple antennas, in
[64], an artificial noise transmission strategy is proposed to
secure the transmission against an eavesdropper with a single
antenna in millimeter wave systems. Millimeter wave channel
is modeled with a ray cluster based spatial channel model. The
sender has partial CSI knowledge on the eavesdropper. The
proposed transmission strategy depends on directions of the
destination and the propagation paths of the eavesdropper. The
secrecy outage probability is used to analyze the transmission
scheme. An optimization problem based on minimizing the
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secrecy outage probability with a secrecy rate constraint is
presented. To solve the optimization problem, a closed-form
optimal power allocation between the information signal and
artificial noise is derived. The secrecy performance of the
millimeter wave system is significantly influenced by the
relationship between the propagation paths of destination and
eavesdropper. The numerical results show that the secrecy
outage is mostly occurred if the common paths are large or
the eavesdropper is close to the transmitter.
To improve EE of the security method using artificial noise,
in [53], an optimization problem is formulated to maximize
the secrecy EE by assuming imperfect CSI of eavesdropper
at transmitter. The system is modeled with one legitimate
transmitter with multiple antennas, and one legitimate receiver
and one eavesdropper, each with a single antenna. Artificial
noise is used at the transmitter. Resource allocation algorithms
are used to solve the optimization problem with correlation
between transmit antennas. With the combination of fractional
programming and sequential convex optimization, the first-
order optimal solutions are computed with a polynomial
complexity.
4) Signal Processing: Besides the three methods above to
provide data confidentiality, in [38], the authors proposed an
original symbol phase rotated (OSPR) secure transmission
scheme to defend against eavesdroppers armed with unlimited
number of antennas in a single cell. Perfect CSI and perfect
channel estimation are assumed. The BS randomly rotates the
phase of original symbols before they are sent to legitimate
user terminals. The eavesdropper can not intercept signals,
only the legitimate users are able to infer the correct phase
rotations recover the original symbols. Symbol error rate of the
eavesdropper is studied, which proves that the eavesdropper
can not intercept the signal properly as long as the base station
is equipped with a sufficient number of antennas.
Considering multiple eavesdroppers in [65], the authors
analyzed the secure performance on a large-scale downlink
system using non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA). The
system considered contains one BS, M NOMA users and
eavesdroppers randomly deployed in an finite zone. A pro-
tected zone around the source node is adopted for enhancing
the security of the random network. Channel statistics for
legitimate receivers and eavesdroppers and secrecy outage
probability are presented. User pair technique is adopted
among the NOMA users. Analytical results show that the
secrecy outage probability of NOMA pairs is determined by
the NOMA users with poorer channel conditions. Simulation
results show that secrecy outage probability decreases when
the radius of the protected zone increases and secrecy outage
probability can be improved by reducing the scope of the user
zone as the path loss decreases.
In [66], the authors proposed a dynamic coordinated mul-
tipoint transmission (CoMP) scheme for BS selection to en-
hance secure coverage. Considering co-channel interference
and eavesdroppers, analysis of the secure coverage probability
is presented. Both analytical and simulation results show that
utilizing CoMP with a proper BS selection threshold the
secure coverage performance can be improved, while secure
coverage probability decreases with the excessive cooperation.
The proposed CoMP scheme has a better performance to resist
more eavesdroppers than the no-CoMP scheme.
In [25], massive MIMO is applied to HetNets to secure the
data confidentiality in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers.
The tractable upper bound expressions for the secrecy outage
probability of HetNet users are derived, which show that mas-
sive MIMO can significantly improve the secrecy performance.
The relationship between the density of picocell base station
and the secrecy outage probability of the HetNet users is
discussed.
5) Cryptographic Methods: Besides the PLS solutions in-
troduced above, cryptographic methods are also used for
implementing data confidentiality by encrypting data with
secret keys. Asymmetric cryptography can be applied to key
distributions. To reduce the cost of encryption, symmetric
cryptography is adopted for data encryption.
In [44], a participating vehicle can send its random sym-
metric key, which is encrypted using TA’s public key. The
symmetric key is used to encrypt the message between TA,
DMV, and participating vehicles. A one-time encryption key is
also encrypted by a public key. The one-time encryption key is
used to encrypt the video. In [45], an initial symmetric session
key is negotiated between the client and a physician after they
establish the client/server relationship. The symmetric key is
then used for the data transmission between the client and the
physician.
D. Key Management
Key management is the procedure or technique that supports
the establishment and maintenance of keying relationships
between authorized parties, where the keying relationship
is the way common data is shared between communication
entities. The common data can be public or secret keys,
initialization values, and other non-secret parameters.
To provide flexible security, in [67], three novel key ex-
change protocols, which have different levels of computational
time, computational complexity, and security, for D2D com-
munications are proposed based on the Diffie-Hellman (DH)
scheme. Details of the key exchange schemes are shown in
Fig. 14. The threat analysis of all three proposed protocols
under common brute force and MITM attacks is presented.
Performance study is provided for the proposed protocols to
evaluate the confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and non-
repudiation of security services based on theoretical analysis.
The analysis proves that the proposed protocols are feasible
with reasonable communication overhead and computational
time.
For D2D group use cases, in [49], a group key management
(GKM) mechanism to secure the exchanged D2D message
during the discovery and communication phases is proposed.
There are five security requirements in the proposed GKM,
namely forward secrecy (users that have left the group should
not have access to the future key), backward secrecy (new
users joining the session should not have access to the old
key), collusion freedom (fraudulent users could not deduce
the current traffic encryption), key independence (keys in
one group should not be able to discover keys in another
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Public channel
Encrypted dedicated channel
Protocol 1 Protocol 2
Protocol 31. User 1 send its DH key k1, the received key by user 2 as k1'
2. User 1 send its DH public key k2, the received key by user 1 as k2'
3. ACK of DH key mutual exchange
4. Start to authentication
Protocol 1
5. Random key K, check function 
Ck(k1',k2)
6. Forward the key K and Ck
7. Accept, if Ck(k1',k2)=Ck(k1,k2'), 
otherwise reject
8. Forward accept or reject
Protocol 3
5. Random key K, user 1 and user 2 generate K1 
and K2 respectively
6. Check value HMAC(k1',k2,K)
7. Check value HMAC(k1,k2',K)
8. K2
9. If HMAC(k1,k2',K)=HMAC(k1',k2,K), send accept 
ACK to eNodeB
10. If accept ACK was send in 9, send K1 to user 2
11. If HMAC(k1',k2,K)=HMAC(k1,k2',K), send accept 
ACK to eNodeB
12. Accept ACK/reject ACK
Protocol 2
5. Random key K, the received 
key by user 1 is K 
6. Check value Ck(k1',k2), K 
7. Check value Ck(k1,k2'), K
8. If K=K  and 
Ck(k1,k2)=Ck(k1,k2'), accept ACK, 
else refuse ACk
Fig. 14: Three key exchange schemes in [67]
group), and trust relationship (do not reveal the keys to any
other part in the same domain or any part in a differen-
t domain). ID-based cryptography (IBC) scheme based on
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) for securing multicast
group communications is presented. The steps of the proposed
protocol include secret key generation, elliptic curve digital
signature algorithm, signature verification, group formation
procedure, key generation, join process, and leave process. The
master key and private key generations are based on IBC and
ECC schemes. The overhead for communications, re-keying
message, and key storage are assessed. The weakness of the
IBC scheme and the ways of creating and using GKM are
compared. The overall performance comparisons show that
the proposed GKM has an enhancement in both the protocol
complexity and security level compared with other works.
ECC is also adopted for the proposed LRSA protocol in
[45]. The network manager generates a partially private and
partially public key for the client and the physician after the
registration. And once the client and the physician establish
the client/server relationship, an initial systematic session key
can be set up for the data transmission.
E. Privacy
As discussed in the previous sections, 5G wireless networks
raise serious concerns on privacy leakage when supporting
more and more vertical industries such as m-health care and
smart transportation [15]. The data flows in 5G wireless
networks carry extensive personal privacy information such as
identity, position, and private contents. In some cases, privacy
leakage may cause serious consequences. Depending on the
privacy requirements of the applications, privacy protection is
a big challenge in 5G wireless networks. There have already
been research work considering location privacy and identity
privacy.
Regarding location privacy, in [48], to protect the location
and preferences of users that can be revealed with associated
algorithms in HetNets, a decentralized algorithm for access
point selection is proposed based on a matching game frame-
work, which is established to measure the preferences of
mobile users and base stations with physical layer system
parameters. Differentially private Gale-Shapley matching al-
gorithm is developed based on differential privacy. Utilities of
mobile users and access points are proposed based on packet
success rate. Simulation results show that the differentially
private algorithm can protect location privacy with a good
quality of service based on utility of the mobile users. In
[37], a location-aware mobile intrusion prevention system
(mIPS) architecture with privacy enhancement is proposed.
The authors presented the mIPS requirements, possible privacy
leakage from managed security services.
In [45], contextual privacy is defined as the privacy of data
source and destination. The identity of the source client is
encrypted by a pseudo identity of the source client with the
public key of the physician using certificateless encryption
mode. Meanwhile, the identity of the intended physician is
also encrypted with the public key of the network manager.
Through these two encryption steps, the contextual privacy can
be achieved. For the proposed reporting service in [44], privacy
is an essential requirement to gain acceptance and participation
of people. The identity and location information of a vehicle
should be preserved against illegal tracing. Meanwhile, a
reporting vehicle should be able to reveal its identity to
the authorities for special circumstances. The pseudonymous
authentication schemes are applied to achieve the conditional
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anonymity and privacy.
IV. SECURITY FOR TECHNOLOGIES APPLIED TO 5G
WIRELESS NETWORK SYSTEMS
In this section, we present the security research activities
from the perspectives of technologies applied to 5G. First
we briefly introduce the technologies applied to 5G. Then
the security activities of each technology are presented. The
technologies applied to 5G wireless networks discussed in this
section are HetNet, massive MIMO, D2D, SDN, and IoT.
A. HetNet
HetNet is a promising technique to provide blanket wireless
coverage and high throughput in 5G wireless networks. It
is a multi-tier system in which nodes in different tier have
different characteristics such as transmission power, coverage
size, and radio access technologies. With the heterogeneous
characteristics, HetNet achieves higher capacity, wider cover-
age and better performance in EE and SE. However, HetNet
architecture, compared to single-tier cellular network, makes
UE more vulnerable to eavesdropping [24]. Moreover, with
the high density of small cells in HetNet, traditional handover
mechanisms could face significant performance issues due
to too frequent handovers between different cells [43]. The
privacy issue in HetNet also faces a big challenge. Location
information becomes more vulnerable due to the high density
of small cells. The conventional association mechanism can
disclose the location privacy information [48].
To tackle the eavesdropping attacks in HetNet, a secret
mobile association policy is proposed based on the maxi-
mum truncated average received signal power (ARSP). The
maximum ARSP should be higher than a pre-set access
threshold in order for mobile to keep active. Otherwise, the
mobile device remains idle. In [24], the authors analyzed
the user connection and secrecy probability of the artificial-
noise-aided secure transmission with the proposed association
policy, which is based on an access threshold. The secrecy
throughput performance can be significantly enhanced with a
proper access threshold used in the association policy.
For enhancing communication coverage in HetNet, coordi-
nated multipoint transmission (CoMP) can be applied [66].
However, CoMP can increase the risk of being eavesdropped
for the legitimate users. In [66], multiple BSs are selected
to transmit the message. A dynamic BS selection scheme is
proposed based on the secure coverage probability. Based on
the theoretical and simulation results, the authors concluded
that the proper BS selection threshold for CoMP can improve
the secure coverage performance.
Security-based resource management has been used to im-
plement security in HetNet. In [52], the authors studied a case
to improve the existing jamming and relaying mechanisms by
proposing a cross-layer cooperation scheme with the aid of
SBSs for protecting the confidentiality of macro cell user com-
munications. The SBSs are motivated by monetary or resource
bonus to become jammers to assist the secure communications
under the constraints of the QoS of their own users.
Due to the high density of small cells, the knowledge of the
cell an user is associated with can easily reveal the location
information of that user. In [48], the authors investigated the
location privacy based on physical layer of association algo-
rithms in 5G. A differential private Gale-Shapley algorithm is
proposed to prevent the leakage of location information with
certain QoS for users. The evaluation of the algorithm based
on different privacy levels is presented with the influence on
utility of users.
The intrusion detection based approach is considered as
one way to provide secure communications. In [68], intrusion
detection techniques for mobile cloud computing in hetero-
geneous 5G are introduced. Several detection methodologies
are studied as signature-based detection, anomaly-based detec-
tion, specification-based detection, stateful protocol analysis,
hybrid intrusion detections with principles of these approach-
es. Traditional password-based authentication and biometric
authentication are discussed for providing different levels of
security.
B. D2D
In D2D communications, devices can communicate with
each other without going through BSs. D2D communications
enable efficient spectrum usage in 5G. Moreover, D2D com-
munications can effectively offload traffic from BSs. However,
the lack of a D2D security infrastructure makes the D2D
communications less secure than the device to network com-
munications [54][69]. To improve the SE, dynamic spectrum
access is usually adopted for D2D links, which can yield
security threats such as jamming [39]. The security issue
becomes a major concern for direct radio communications and
large-scale deployment of D2D groups [49].
Cooperation between D2D nodes is a popular way to
secure the D2D communications against eavesdroppers. The
legitimate transmitters with a common receiver can improve
their reliable transmission rate through cooperation. In [58],
the authors proposed a cooperation scheme to secure D2D
communications considering distance. Before the cooperation,
devices can check the distance to test whether cooperation
can improve the security of the communications. The distance
constraints can be used to determine cooperation jointly,
cooperation from one side, or no cooperation to maximize the
achievable secrecy rate. With no specific requirements for the
D2D communications, the proposed scheme can be applied to
all D2D communications scenarios.
Besides cooperation, power control and channel access are
also considered in securing D2D communications. In [59],
optimal power control and channel access of D2D link are
proposed to maximize the achievable rate of cellular users
and the physical layer secrecy rate of D2D links. The system
model is shown in Fig. 13. The utility function of a single
D2D user is modeled by considering PLS requirement and
payment of interference from other D2D users. A Stackelberg
game approach is used, where the price from cellular users are
leaders and transmission power of D2D users are followers.
The channel access problem of D2D links is discussed to
maximize the achievable secrecy rate of D2D links and to
minimize the interference to the cellular users.
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To provide a measurement for security level, continuous
authenticity with legitimacy patterns is proposed in [54] to
enable wireless security scoring. Security scoring based on
probability of attack detection is applied to prevent, react, and
detect attacks. The continuous legitimacy pattern is inserted
into packets to authenticate the integrity and authenticity of
transmissions.
Considering the assistance of the network, in [67], key
exchange protocols involved with the two D2D users and
eNodeB are proposed. Two scenarios are considered. For the
traffic offload scenario, D2D users are connected to the same
eNodeB. For the social networking scenario, D2D link is
required for the applications in each D2D user. Public channel
and encrypted dedicated channel are applied to the process
of key exchange. The eNodeB is involved in the initial key
exchange and mutual authentication of the D2D users. Based
on the role of eNodeB in the authentication process, three
different key exchange protocols are proposed with different
computational time and complexity.
The security algorithms and solutions for public cellular
systems are not adapted to the short radio range D2D com-
munications. The security issues in both proximity service
discovery and communication phases for D2D communica-
tions are presented and addressed by proposing a group key
management mechanism using IBC [49]. Key distributions and
key revocations are two problems in group key management
(GKM). Five security requirements of GKM are defined and
corresponding solutions are provided. A key graph is applied
by dividing a group of members into subgroups to reduce the
complexity of join process and leave process.
With the development of D2D technique, m-health ap-
plications are adopted to improve efficiency and quality of
healthcare services. The security requirements for D2D com-
munications used in m-health system are analyzed in [45].
The protocol needs to secure the data that is not accessed
by relays and to achieve mutual authentication between the
source and the intended physician without interaction. It
also requires light weight for mobile terminals with energy
and storage constraints and needs to be robust enough to
fight against threats as part of the keys can be exposed. A
certificateless public key cryptography is applied to achieve the
security requirements. The private key of a user is generated
by both key generator center and the user, which makes
the key generator center unaware about user’s private key.
Authentication is achieved by recognizing the public key.
Security objectives of m-health network are defined as data
confidentiality and integrity, mutual authentication, anonymity
to anyone except intended physician, unlinkability, forward
security and contextual privacy.
C. Massive MIMO
By utilizing a large number of antennas at BSs, massive
MIMO can provide high EE and SE to support more users
simultaneously. The large number of antennas at BSs can
significantly improve the throughput, EE performance, and
shift the most of signal processing and computation from user
terminals to BSs [38]. Moreover, massive MIMO can improve
the security of communications. In [25] the authors considered
PLS for a downlink K-tier HetNet system with multiple eaves-
droppers. Each MBS is armed with large antenna arrays using
linear zero-forcing beamforming. Both theoretical analysis and
simulation results show that massive MIMO can significantly
enhance the secrecy outage probability of the macrocell users.
However, eavesdropper can utilize massive MIMO to attack
the legitimate communications. In the system model [38],
the authors considered massive MIMO at both BS and the
eavesdropper. The antenna arrays of the eavesdropper are far
more powerful. The OSPR approach is introduced. Theoretical
and simulation analysis shows that the antenna number at the
BS can significantly impact the security performance. With
the number of antennas at the BS is sufficiently high, the
massive MIMO eavesdropper fails to decode the majority of
the original symbols while the legitimate users are able to
recover the original symbols with only a limited number of
antennas. Compared to other approaches involved in jamming,
the proposed method has a higher EE.
D. SDN
By decoupling the control plane from the data plane,
SDN enables centralized control of the network and brings
promising methods to make the network management simpler,
more programmable, and more elastic [9]. Information can
be shared between cells by using SDN. SDN can provide
three key attributes, namely logically centralized intelligence,
programmability, and abstraction [70] so that scalability and
flexibility of the network can be greatly improved and cost
can be significantly reduced. A survey of software-defined
mobile network (SDMN) and its related security problems are
provided in [26].
In [9], the authors discussed the pros and cons of the SDN
security. The pros of SDN security over traditional networks
are shown in Table. II. Besides the pros of the SDN brought
to 5G wireless networks, the new security issues caused
by SDN are presented in Table. III, together with possible
countermeasures.
In [22], the authors discussed the limitations in present
mobile networks. A SDMN architecture consisting of an
application, control plane, and data plane is proposed, which
integrates SDN, NFV and cloud computing. The security
mechanisms in legacy cellular networks are presented with
their limitations. The expected security advantages of SDMN
are introduced. The security perspectives that can be improved
through SDMN are listed. Besides the advantages of SDMN,
threat vectors for SDMN architecture are also presented. In
[35], the open issues of 5G security and trust based on NFV
and SDN are elaborated. Corresponding security and trust
frameworks are proposed, which use NFV Trust Platform as
a service, security function as a service and trust functions as
a service.
To address the threats in SDMN, in [36], security attack
vectors of SDN are presented. The authors modeled the net-
work attacks by using attack graph. Analytic hierarchy process
and technique are applied to calculate the node minimal effort
for SDMN. A case study based on MobileFow architecture
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TABLE II: The pros of SDN security over traditional networks [9]
SDN characteristic Attributed to Security use
Global network view CentralizationTraffic statistics collection
Network-wide intrusion detection
Detection of switch’s malicious behavior
Network forensics
Self-healing
mechanisms
Conditional rules
Traffic statistics collection
Reactive packet dropping
Reactive packet redirection
Increased control
capabilities Flow-based forwarding scheme Access control
TABLE III: New security issues that SDN networks are exposed to along with possible countermeasures [9]
Targeted level Malicious behavior Caused by Possible countermeansures
Forwarding plane Switch DoS
Limited forwarding table storage capacity
Enormous number of flows
Limited switchs buffering capacity
Proactive rule caching
Rule aggregation
Increasing switchs buffering capacity
Decreasing switch-controller communication delay
Packet encryption
and tunnel bypassing Invisible header fields Packet type classification based on traffic analysis
Control plane DDoS attack
Centralization
Limited forwarding table storage capacity
Enormous number of flows
Controller replication
Dynamic master controller assignment
Efficient controller placement
Compromised controller attacks Centralization Controller replication with diversityEfficient controller assignments
Forwarding-control Link MITM attacks
Communication message sent in clear
Lack of authentication
Encryption
Use of digital signatures
Replay attacks Communication message sent in clearLack of time stamping
Encryption
Time stamp inclusion in encrypted messages
is presented as an example to test the proposed vulnerability
assessment mechanism.
Due to the high density of small cells in 5G, key manage-
ment is difficult with user frequently joining and leaving the
small cells. Moreover, speeding up the authentication process
is essential to ensure the low latency requirement in 5G. In
[43], SDN is introduced into the system model to enable the
coordination between different heterogeneous cells. A SDN
controller is used to monitor and predict the user locations. The
multiple physical layer characteristics are constantly sampled
by the SDN controller to show the performance of the multiple
SCI combination. The weighted SCI design and decision rules
are proposed. The SDN mode uses the priority queuing and
arriving traffic is modeled as a Pareto distribution. The latency
performance of the SDN based authentication is shown to
be better than the performance of traditional cryptographic
methods based on different load situations. By pre-shared SCI
over SDN, security framework can have a higher tolerance
level to deal with failures of the network.
E. IoT
Due to the limited computation capability of IoT nodes,
security services in 5G IoT devices need to be efficient and
lightweight. Relaying has been considered as an effective
mechanism in IoT networks to save the power of IoT nodes
and also to extend the transmission coverage.
In [40], a fusion center is used to protect IoT nodes with
limited computation power from jammer. Each IoT node
is equipped with a sensor to detect the interference. The
betweenness centrality of each IoT node is taken consideration
to measure the importance of the node over the network. The
decentralized interference measurements are collected at the
fusion center in regular intervals on a common control channel.
A certain level threshold and aggregated received interference
power level are used to determine whether a jamming attack
exists or not. The authors assumed that the jammer knows
the topology of the network and correspondingly allocates
certain interference power to the IoT nodes to decrease their
SINR. The fusion center can also allocate bandwidth to certain
nodes to measure the interference level in order to detect the
jammer attack. Therefore, a non-cooperative Colonel Blotto
game between the jammer and the fusion center is formed as
a resource distribution problem.
In [63], the security of relay communications in IoT net-
works is introduced by considering power allocation and
codeword rate design over two-hop transmission against ran-
domly distributed eavesdroppers. The problem is formulated to
maximize the secrecy rate. Both single- and multiple-antenna
cases at relays and eavesdroppers are considered. It is shown
that proper relay transmission can extend secure coverage and
the increase of the number of antennas at relay nodes can
improve the security level.
RFID is an automatic identification and data capture tech-
nology widely used in IoT networks. In [55], a RFID secure
application revocation scheme is proposed to efficiently and
securely use multi-application RFID and revoke applications in
the tag. Based on theoretical analysis, the proposed scheme can
achieve a higher level of security than other existing schemes.
V. PROPOSED 5G WIRELESS SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we present the proposed 5G wireless net-
work security architecture. First we illustrate a 5G wireless
network architecture, based on which we further propose a
corresponding security architecture. Identity management and
flexible authentication based on the proposed 5G security
architecture are analyzed. A handover procedure and signaling
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load analysis are studied to illustrate the advantages of the
proposed 5G wireless security architecture.
A. 5G Wireless Network Architecture
In this subsection, we introduce a 5G wireless network
architecture. As shown in Fig. 15, the illustrated general
5G wireless network architecture includes a user interface,
a cloud-based heterogeneous radio access network, a next
generation core, distributed edge cloud and central cloud. The
cloud-based heterogeneous radio access network can combine
virtualization, centralization and coordination techniques for
efficient and flexible resource allocation. Based on different
use cases, 3GPP classifies more than 70 different use cases
into four different groups such as massive IoT, critical commu-
nications, network operation, and enhanced mobile broadband
[71]. In the cloud-based heterogeneous access network, be-
sides the 3GPP access and non-3GPP access, other new radio
technologies will be added for more efficient spectrum utiliza-
tion. In the first stage of 5G, the legacy evolved packet core
(EPC) will still be valid. Network slicing is applied to enable
different parameter configurations for the next generation core
according different use cases. New flexible service-oriented
EPC based on network slicing, SDN, and NFV will be used
in the next generation core as virtual EPC (VEPC) shown in
the Fig .15. The VEPC is composed of modularized network
functions. Based on different use cases, the network functions
applied to each VEPC can be various. In the VEPC, control
plane and user plane are separated for flexibility and scalability
of the next generation core. Edge cloud is distributed to
improve the service quality. Central cloud can implement
global data share and centralized control.
Compared with the legacy cellular networks, 5G wireless
networks introduce some new perspectives and changes. (1)
User equipment and services are not limited to regular mobile
phone and regular voice and data services. Based on different
use cases and requirements, user interfaces are classified into
four different groups such as massive IoT, critical communi-
cations, network operation, and enhanced mobile broadband.
Every use case can affect the radio access selection and VEPC
functions. (2) In addition to 3GPP access and non-3GPP access
in the cloud-based heterogeneous radio access network, 5G
access network includes other new radios, which build the
foundation of wireless standards for the next generation mobile
networks for higher spectrum utilization. The new radios can
support the performance and connectivity requirements of
various use cases in 5G wireless networks. Moreover, there are
many technologies applied to the access network to improve
the network performance, such as massive MIMO, HetNet,
and D2D communications. (3) The next generation core will
be based on cloud using network slicing, SDN and NFV to
handle different use cases. The flexible service-oriented VEPC
will be applied. With network slicing, SDN and NFV, different
network functions can be applied to the service-oriented VEPC
for different use cases. The next generation core is expected to
be access-independent. Separation of control and user plane is
important to achieve an access-agnostic, flexible and scalable
architecture. (4) Edge cloud is applied to 5G wireless network
to improve the performance of the network, such as latency.
B. 5G Wireless Security Architecture
Based on the illustrated 5G wireless network architecture,
we propose a 5G wireless security architecture as shown in
Fig. 16. With the new characteristics of the next generation
core, a separation of data plane and control plane of VEPC is
proposed, where the data plane can be programmable for its
flexibility. The major network functions in the control plane
of the next generation core are identified in TR 23.799, which
are utilized in our proposed security architecture as follows:
• Access and mobility management function (AMF): The
function is applied to manage access control and mobility,
which is implemented in MME for legacy cellular net-
work. This can be vary with different use cases. Mobility
management function is not necessary for fixed access
applications.
• Session management function (SMF): Based on network
policy, this function can set up and manage sessions. For
a single AMF, multiple SMF can be assigned to manage
different sessions of a single user.
• Unified data management (UDM): UDM manages sub-
scriber data and profiles (such as authentication data
of users) for both fixed and mobile access in the next
generation core.
• Policy control function (PCF): This function provides
roaming and mobility management, quality of service,
and network slicing. AMF and SMF are controlled by
PCF. Differentiated security can be provided with PCF.
AMF and SMF are integrated in the legacy cellular networks
as MME. The separation of AMF and SMF can support a
more flexible and scalable architecture. In the network function
based control plane, different network functions can be applied
to different use cases.
Similar to the legacy cellular networks, four security do-
mains are defined in Fig. 16 as A, B, C, D. The details of
these security domains are introduced as follows.
Network access security (A). The set of security features
that provide the user interface to access the next generation
core securely and protect against various attacks on the radio
access link. The new physical layer technologies applied to
the radio access network including massive MIMO, HetNet,
D2D communications and mmWave bring new challenges and
opportunities in network access security. This level has securi-
ty mechanisms such as confidentiality and integrity protection
between the user interface and radio access network. Current
researches on network access security focus on providing user
identity and location confidentiality, user data and signaling
data confidentiality, and entity authentication.
Network domain security (B): The set of security features
that protect against attacks in the wire line networks and enable
different entities and functions to exchange signaling data and
user data in a secure manner. As we can see in Fig. 16, this
level security exists between access network and next genera-
tion core, control plane and user plane. Since new technologies
such as cloud technique, network slicing and NFV are applied
to 5G core and radio access network, new vulnerabilities in this
level need to be addressed. However, with the separation of
control plane and user plane, the amount of signaling data will
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Fig. 16: The proposed 5G wireless network security architecture
be significantly reduced. The network function based control
plane also reduces the required signaling overhead for data
synchronization. Entity authentication, data confidentiality and
data integrity are the main security services in this level. With
the independent characteristics of access technologies of AMF,
the network domain security performance can be simplified
and improved.
User domain security (C): The set of security features that
provide mutual authentication between the user interface and
the next generation core before the control plane access to the
user interface. Authentication is the main focus in this level.
Based on the use case, the authentication may be needed for
more than two parties. For example, the authentication can
be required between user and network operator as well as
between user and service provider. Moreover, different service
providers may need to authenticate each other to share the
same user identity management. Compared to the device-based
identity management in legacy cellular networks, new identity
management methods are needed to improve the security
performance.
Application domain security (D): The set of security fea-
tures that ensure the security message exchange between
applications on the interfaces, between user interface and
service provider, as well as between user and network operator.
C. 5G Wireless Security Services
In this subsection, we first analyze the identity management
and flexible authentication based on the proposed 5G wireless
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security architecture. An analysis on the handover procedure
and signaling load based on the proposed security architecture
are presented.
1) Identity management: In the legacy cellular networks,
the identity management relies on the universal subscriber
identity module (USIM) cards. However, in 5G wireless net-
works, there are many equipment such as smart home devices,
sensors and vehicles that are supported without USIM card. As
shown in Fig. 16, UDM will handle the identity management
based on cloud. Moreover, anonymity service is required
in many use cases in 5G wireless networks. Therefore, the
identity management will be different in 5G wireless networks
compared with that in the legacy cellular networks. New
identity management is required.
With the massive connected devices and applications, effi-
ciently managing massive identities is significantly important
to ensure the service performance. In the legacy cellular
networks, the identity management is device-based. For a
certain new use case such as smart home, one user can have
multiple devices needed to access the network and services.
User-based identity management will be more efficient to let
the user determine what devices are allowed to access the
network and services. One user may have multiple device
identities. Except only considering the device identity, service
identity can be added with device identity as device and service
identity management. The device identity is unique and service
identity can be assigned by service providers in certain session.
With service identity, revocation process will be simplified.
Moreover, for the trusted service providers, federated iden-
tity management can be applied to simplify the identity man-
agement and also improve the user experience. The identity
management in 5G wireless networks is not unified for all use
cases. Based on the characteristics of the use case, different
identity management can be applied as shown in the Fig. 17.
2) Flexible authentication: As discussed in the previous
section, in the legacy cellular networks, mutual authentication
is applied between a user and the network. However, the
authentication between a user and the services provider is not
implemented by the network. In 5G wireless network systems,
some use cases may require both the service provider and
network provider to carry out authentication with the users.
In the legacy cellular networks, for 3GPP access, the AKA is
applied between a user equipment and a mobile management
entity. For non-3GPP access, AKA is applied between a user
equipment and an authentication authorization and accounting
(AAA) server. Full authentication is required once a user
changes its access technology. Based on our proposed security
Authentication 
Mechanism Selection
User equipment
Access technique
Service requirement
Security requirement
Trust Model
Cryptographic function
Fig. 18: Authentication mechanism selection
architecture, AMF can handle the authentication independent
of the access technologies. In other words, a full authentication
is not required when a user changes its access technology.
Moreover, based on PCF, AMF can perform different authen-
tication schemes for different service requirements.
Flexible authentication is required in 5G wireless networks
to ensure the security while satisfying the quality of services
requirements. The input and output of the authentication mech-
anism selection are shown in Fig. 18. The input information
can be included in PCF, which can control AMF to perform
the authentication procedure.
D. Handover Procedure and Signaling Load Analysis
In this subsection, analysis on handover procedure and
signaling load are presented based on the proposed security
architecture for a HetNet with different access technologies
including 5G new radio, 3GPP access and Non-3GPP access.
The system model is shown in Fig. 19, where a user A
currently associates with 3GPP access point MBS. Assume
that SBSs have different access technologies compared with
MBS. When user A is moving, it may need to connect with
a new radio access point (NRAP), in which case handover is
needed in the legacy cellular networks. In our proposed se-
curity architecture, AMF is independent from different access
technologies. User A can connect with the same AMF through
different access technologies. The first time user A associates
with an access point, a general authentication procedure is
needed. Assume that the same authentication scheme is applied
to the proposed 5G wireless network security architecture and
the legacy security architecture. The authentication of first time
access to the network for user A based on different security
architectures is shown in Fig. 20. Since AMF and UDM are
both in the control plane, the cost for information exchange
between AMF and UDM is less than that between different
entities such as MME and HSS. Based on the legacy security
architecture, the authentication vector is generated at HSS
and is then transmitted to MME. However, in our proposed
security architecture, authentication vector can be generated
at AMF to reduce the overhead of communications and to
reduce the risk to expose the KASME and XRES. With the
flexibility of network functions, AMF and UDM can be widely
distributed to handle the authentication of a massive number
of user devices. Nevertheless, due to the coupled control plane
and user plane, MME and HSS have limited scalability.
Once user A changes its access point using another access
technology in legacy cellular networks, the same authenti-
cation as shown in Fig. 20b is needed for each handover,
which not only increases latency and communication overhead
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but also leads to possible connection outage. However, based
on the proposed security architecture, no authentication will
be needed by switching to different SMF for a new session
and a new IP address allocation. The handover based on
the proposed 5G wireless security architecture is presented
in Fig. 21. The data update from SMF includes the new
session key and new IP address from the new access point.
The communication latency between AMF and SMF can be
neglected compared to the communication latency from MME
to HSS. Moreover, the signaling overhead based on the 5G
wireless security architecture is much lower because of the
separation of control plane and user plane as shown in Fig. 22.
To satisfy certain latency requirement, the number of gateway
nodes needs to be increased by a factor of 20 to 30 times of the
current number [72]. The separation of control and user plane
of gateway can also facilitate distributed gateway deployment.
Therefore, for the new core network based on control and
user plane separation, the signaling load can be significantly
reduced.
VI. CHALLENGES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR 5G
WIRELESS SECURITY
The challenges and future directions for 5G security re-
search and development are presented in this section. Ac-
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Fig. 21: A handover procedure for access technologies change
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Fig. 22: Signaling architecture comparison of legacy cellular
network and 5G cellular network
cording to the previous sections, part of the security solutions
used in 4G will be evolved into 5G. However, with extensive
use cases and various integrated technologies applied to 5G,
security services in 5G face many challenges in order to
address 5G advanced features. Several perspectives of the
challenges and corresponding future directions are discussed
as follows.
A. New Trust Models
With the advanced services offered by 5G wireless net-
works, not only new types of functions are provided to people
and society, but also new services are applied to vertical
industries, such as smart grid, smart home, vehicular networks
and m-health networks, etc. In the legacy cellular networks,
user terminals, home, and serving networks are considered in
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the trust model. The trust models vary among different use
cases which can involve new actors in 5G wireless networks
[12]. The authentication may need to be implemented between
various actors with multiple trust levels.
There have been research work on trust models for different
use cases. In [44], the authors proposed a system model to
facilitate secure data transmission over 5G wireless networks
for vehicular communications. DMV, TA, LEA, and vehicles
are included in the proposed system model. The trust model
between them is more complex than the trust model in the
legacy cellular networks. With the massive number of devices
over 5G wireless networks, new trust models are needed to
improve the performance of security services such as IoT user
cases authentication. However, it lacks a trust model between
devices and fusion center in [40]. For some applications,
there are various types of devices connected to the same
network, some of which may be used only to gather data
and some of which may be used only to access internet. The
trust requirements of different devices should be different.
For different security demands, the corresponding trust model
may have different security requirements. As an example,
a high security level demand may require both password
and biometric authentication simultaneously [15]. In a m-
health network, in [45] the authors provided the trust model
between client, network management and physician based on
the privacy requirements.
In summary, various new trust models for new applications
in 5G are needed. These new trust models will affect the
security services.
B. New Security Attack Models
Based on the recent research activities on PLS, the most
used attack model consists of a single eavesdropper armed with
a single antenna. However, the number of eavesdroppers can
be high in 5G wireless networks. Moreover, eavesdroppers can
be armed with massive MIMO technology [38]. In practical
scenarios, there may exist different types of attacks. By only
considering one kind attack, the cooperation of jammer or
eavesdroppers are not considered in PLS, which can make
the security in PHY more complex. Although increasing the
transmission power of the sender can fight against jamming
attack, it may also increase the risk of eavesdropping attacks.
Moreover, with the new service delivery model applied to
SDN and NFV, there are more vulnerable points exposed [9].
Decoupling software from hardware makes the security of
software no longer depending on the specific security attributes
of the hardware platform [12]. Therefore, the demands on
strong isolation for virtualization are ever increasing. Network
slicing is introduced in [11] to provide the isolated security.
In [36], an effective vulnerability assessment mechanism is
proposed for SDN based mobile networks using attack graph
algorithm. A comprehensive security attack vector map of
SDN is presented.
The various new attack models in 5G wireless networks
based on the new technologies and delivery models make
the security implementation harder than in the legacy cellular
networks. However, there has been limited work on the new
security attack models and corresponding solutions.
C. Privacy Protection
With data involved in various new applications in 5G, huge
volume of sensitive data are being transmitted through the
5G wireless networks. 5G wireless networks raise serious
concerns on privacy leakage due to the open network platforms
[15]. The protection of the privacy is an important requirement
for implementing different applications. The privacy protection
in different use cases can vary based on the security require-
ments, such as location privacy, identity privacy. For example,
in [45], to secure the privacy of patients, the proposed protocol
provides security of data access and mutual authentication
between patients and physician. The location privacy also
draws great attention. In [48], a differential private association
algorithm is proposed to secure the location information due
to the vulnerable location leakage in HetNets. For vehicular
communications, in [44], the privacy protection is considered
as protection of the identity of a vehicle and the video contents.
In order to offer differentiated quality of privacy protection, the
type of service offered to a user needs to be sensed. However,
the service type sensing may also have a chance to leak user
privacy [15].
The privacy protection is mostly implemented by encryption
mechanisms currently. With the massive data, encryption and
decryption may violate other service requirements of 5G, such
as latency and efficiency. To efficiently protect privacy is
a big challenge, especially when facing the powerful data
analysis methods such as machine learning. However, data
analysis can also be used as a mechanism to help implement
the privacy protection intelligently. For example, before the
data transmission, data analysis can be applied to find out
several highly sensitive dimensions to reduce the encryption
cost with privacy protection. For the identity privacy, new
identity management should be considered instead of using
only device-based identity management. Location privacy can
be enhanced if multiple association mechanisms are applied
to different use cases. Adding all this together makes it more
challenging to provide satisfactory privacy protection in 5G
wireless networks.
D. Flexibility and Efficiency
To address different security requirements for different
applications and dynamic configurations of the 5G architecture
based on virtualization, the security mechanisms must be
flexible [12] [15]. The security setup must be customized
and optimized to support each specific application instead
of an approach fitting all [20]. Therefore, for each security
service, different security levels need to be considered for
different scenarios. If differentiated security is offered, a
flexible security architecture is needed [15]. In our proposed
security architecture, network functions in the control plane are
various depending on the use cases. AMF and SMF provide
flexible security mechanisms based on the requirements of
PCF. Therefore, the flexibility is not only required in security
architecture but also in security mechanisms.
Besides the flexibility of security architecture and mecha-
nisms, efficiency of security is another key requirement in 5G
wireless networks to ensure both the latency requirement and
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EE. One of the potential security requirements is to minimize
the security-related signaling overhead to ensure the efficiency
[20] [73]. The latency can be reduced by reducing the overhead
of security load [74]. Since EE and latency performances of 5G
wireless networks are expected to be improved compared to
the legacy wireless networks, the security efficiency should be
ensured to secure the performances of 5G wireless networks.
Based on the proposed security architecture, the separation
of control plane and user plane and network functions inside
the control plane reduce the signaling overhead. For the IoT
applications, the nodes normally have limited computation
capability and battery power, efficient security mechanisms
are required. Moreover, distributed authentication nodes need
to support the fast network access for massive number of
devices. For the vehicular communications sensitive to laten-
cy, lightweight and efficient security solutions are desirable
[12][15][45]. Moving the control plane closer to the edge of
the core network can also reduce the communication latency.
Therefore, to improve the efficiency of 5G wireless networks,
both security architecture and security mechanisms need to be
improved.
E. Unified Security Management
Although there are different services, access technologies
and devices over 5G wireless networks, a security framework
with a common and essential set of security features such as
access authentication and confidentiality protection is needed
[74]. The basic features of these security services may be
similar to those in the legacy cellular networks. However, there
are many new perspectives of these security features in 5G
wireless networks, such as the security management across
heterogeneous access and security management for a large
number of devices. As we present in the previous section
of the new identity management, flexible authentication and
the handover between different access technologies based on
the proposed security architecture, security management across
heterogeneous access need to be defined to offer flexibility for
all access technologies. Also, for a large number of devices,
such as IoT applications, security management of burst access
behavior need to be studied in order to support the efficient
access authentication.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
5G wireless networks are expected to provide advanced per-
formance to enable many new applications. In this paper, we
have presented a comprehensive study on recent development
of 5G wireless security. The current security solutions mainly
based on the security services provided such as authentication,
availability, data confidentiality, key management and privacy
have been introduced. Many new security aspects in 5G are
expected due to the applications of technologies such as
HetNet, D2D, massive MIMO, SDN and IoT. The security
involving these technologies have been summarized. Based
on these studies, we have proposed a 5G wireless security
architecture. The analysis of identity management and flexible
authentication based on the proposed security architecture have
been presented. A handover procedure and performance have
been studied to show the advantage of the proposed security
architecture. Finally, we have presented the challenges and
future directions of 5G wireless security. We expect that this
work could address the security concerns from both industry
and academia to provide research directions for implementing
security on 5G wireless networks in the near future.
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